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Abstract—DRAM manufacturers have been prioritizing
memory capacity, yield, and bandwidth for years, while
trying to keep the design complexity as simple as possible.
DRAM chips are passive elements that store data, but they do
not carry out any computation or other important function
in the system, such as security. Processors implement and
execute most of the existing security mechanisms that protect
the system against security threats, because 1) executing se-
curity mechanisms usually require non-trivial computational
capabilities (e.g., encryption), and 2) commodity DRAM
chips are not designed to perform computations or tasks
other than data storage.
In this work, we advocate for DRAM as a key component
for providing security mechanisms to the system. To this
end, we propose Dataplant, a new class of low-cost, high-
performance, and reliable security primitives that can be
integrated in commodity DRAM chips with minimal changes.
The main idea of Dataplant is to slightly modify the internal
DRAM timing signals to expose the inherent process varia-
tion found in all DRAM chips for generating unpredictable
but reproducible values (e.g., keys) within DRAM, without
affecting regular DRAM operation.
We use Dataplant to build two new security mechanisms.
First, a new Dataplant-based physical unclonable function
(PUF) with non-destructive read-out, low evaluation latency,
robust responses, resiliency to temperature changes, and
data-independent responses. Second, a new cold boot attack
prevention mechanism based on Dataplant that automatically
destroys all data within DRAM on every power cycle with
zero run-time energy and latency overheads. These mecha-
nisms can be integrated with current DDR memory chips
without changing the DRAM array.
Using a combination of detailed simulations and exper-
iments with 136 real commodity DRAM chips, we show
that our Dataplant-based PUF has 1.8x higher throughput
than the best state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs while being more
resilient to temperature changes, and totally independent of
the values stored in memory. We also demonstrate that our
Dataplant-based cold boot attack protection mechanism is
19.5x faster and consumes 2.54x less energy when compared
to existing mechanisms.
1. Introduction
Modern processors have security support for encryp-
tion and memory isolation [1] that protects secret data
in memory from attackers. Unfortunately these mech-
anisms cause significant performance and energy over-
heads [2] and introduce new vulnerabilities [3], [4]. Al-
though DRAM is a key component of many systems
that often stores critical or secret information, there is
no hardware security support implemented in commodity
chips that accelerates or enhances security.
We make a case for incorporating security primitives
in commodity DRAM chips based on three fundamen-
tal observations. First, DRAM is ubiquitous in computer
systems today, from high-end servers to low-cost Internet
of Things (IoT) devices [5]. Therefore, millions of users
can benefit from having simple and low-cost security
primitives in DRAM (e.g., easy to adopt by the industry).
Second, critical data usually resides in main memory, and
it is usually replicated across the processor caches. This
introduces new sources for potential security breaches that
make the system vulnerable to attacks (e.g., cache side
channels). To reduce this security risks, one solution is to
minimize data replication across the system and process
critical data close to where it resides (e.g., memory). Third,
the data movement throughout the memory hierarchy
causes energy, performance and bandwidth overheads [6].
Our goal is to develop low-cost primitives in com-
modity DRAM chips for supporting commonly-used se-
curity mechanisms. To this end, we propose Dataplant, a
novel low-cost, high-performance, and reliable class of in-
DRAM security primitives. The key idea of Dataplant is
to take advantage of inherent DRAM behavior to generate
unpredictable values, which we can use to support several
system-level security mechanisms. This work is the first to
propose security primitives that are simple enough so that
can be integrated with existing commodity DRAM chips.
Our primitives are variants of existing DRAM commands
(e.g., activation) that only require minimal timing changes
to certain internal DRAM signals. Therefore, Dataplant
primitives require no changes to the DRAM array. We
propose two Dataplant primitives that complement each
other: 1) US-Dataplant generates values in the DRAM
Sense Amplifiers (SAs), and 2) UC-Dataplant generates
values in the DRAM cells.
US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant enable the implemen-
tation of security mechanisms efficiently in DRAM. We
analyze and evaluate two such security mechanisms in this
work: (1) physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [7]–[19]
and (2) cold boot attack prevention [20]–[23].
1. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). PUFs are
usually used in cryptography to identify devices or to
create authentication keys. The main advantage of DRAM-
based PUFs is that DRAM is ubiquitous in many computer
systems today. However, existing DRAM PUFs [24]–[29]
have at least one of these four main issues. First, most
DRAM PUFs have destructive read out (e.g., they destroy
the memory content). Second, most DRAM PUFs have a
latency that is very high to be used at runtime without
system interference. Third, most DRAM PUFs are very
noisy, so they require a filtering mechanism to calculate the
PUF responses. Fourth, most of the DRAM PUFs provide
responses that highly depend on temperature, which can
affect the reliability of the generated keys. Avoiding this
issue requires extra engineering effort (e.g., maintaining
the DRAM at a constant temperature, or making the sys-
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tem temperature-aware). This issue is especially important
in devices that are in the wild (e.g., IoT devices that use
DRAM [5], [30], [31]). In this work, we aim to solve these
issues with our Dataplant-based DRAM PUFs (Section 5).
2. Cold Boot Attack Prevention. Physical attacks to com-
puter systems are gaining relevance due to the fast growing
of unsupervised systems in the wild (e.g., IoT devices)
and the widespread use of mobile systems (e.g., laptops).
One of the simplest and most effective physical attacks
is the cold boot attack [20]–[23], [32], [33]. The goal of
a cold boot attack is to retrieve secret information stored
in DRAM from the victim’s computer system. A common
approach to mitigate this attack is by encrypting the entire
memory [34]–[39], which can be expensive in terms of
hardware cost, power consumption and performance. In
this work, we propose a cold boot attack prevention mech-
anism based on Dataplant that immediately and reliably
destroys all data inside DRAM, automatically at power
up, without incurring any latency or power overhead at
runtime (Section 6).
We extensively evaluate our Dataplant primitives and
the two security mechanisms that they enable by using a
combination of detailed circuit-level simulations, system
simulations, and experiments on real DRAM chips. We
obtain two key results. First, our Dataplant-based PUFs
are 1.8x faster while achieving better repeatability un-
der changing temperatures than the best state-of-the-art
DRAM PUFs [29], [40], and being totally independent
of the values stored in memory. We also show that the
unpredictable numbers generated by Dataplant with data
obtained from real commodity DRAM chips pass all NIST
tests [41], demonstrating randomness and suitability for
security mechanisms. Second, our Dataplant-based cold
boot attack protection is 34x faster and 2.5x more energy
efficient than a system implementing our prevention mech-
anism without Dataplant. Dataplant also enables other
security mechanisms (e.g., secure deallocation [42]), and it
can be used by system designers and software developers
once Dataplant is available in commodity DRAM chips.
We make the following key contributions:
• We propose Dataplant, a new class of low-cost in-
DRAM primitives that generate values in DRAM (Sec-
tion 4). Dataplant enables new security mechanisms in
all systems that use commodity DRAM. We design
two different Dataplant implementations with different
trade-offs. Dataplant is especially practical in computer
systems with limited hardware or low-cost requirements.
• We propose two new DRAM PUFs based on Dataplant
primitives that solve some of the main issues of state-
of-the-art DRAM PUFs (Section 5).
• We propose a new cold boot attack prevention mecha-
nism based on Dataplant primitives that does not incur
any latency or power overhead at runtime (Section 6).
• We extensively evaluate our Dataplant primitives and
the security mechanisms they enable, and we demon-
strate that they are significantly faster and more energy-
efficient than their state-of-the-art counterparts (Sec-
tion 7).
2. Background
2.1. DRAM
We provide background on the DRAM architecture
relevant to this work. We describe the organization of a
DRAM chip, the architecture of its sense amplifiers and
the operations that are performed on a DRAM chip.
DRAM Organization DRAM chips are manufactured in
a variety of configurations [43], including a range of
capacities and data bus widths ranging between 4 and 16
pins. Since an individual DRAM chip has a small capacity
and a limited data width, multiple DRAM chips are usually
grouped together in the same DRAM module to form a
rank, providing a larger data bus (usually 64-bits wide).
Specialized DRAM for IoT can have fewer chips and a
narrower bus [5], [30], [31].
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Figure 1: DRAM organization, sense amplifier, and cell.
Each DRAM chip consists of multiple banks, and each
bank contains multiple 2D arrays (or subarrays) of DRAM
cells as shown in Figure 1. The cells are stacked in rows
of 4 or 8 KB that share a wordline. Each cell consists of a
capacitor which stores the data in form of charge, and an
access transistor controlled by the wordline that connects
the cell to the Sense Amplifier through the bitline.
DRAM Sense Amplifier (SA) The Sense Amplifiers
(SAs) are used for sensing and amplifying the small charge
of the cell capacitor to a CMOS-readable value. A set
of SAs connected to a row of cells is called row buffer.
Figure 1 shows how a cell is connected to a SA via a
bitline. The actions related to the functioning of the SA can
be summarized into three steps. First, to be able to sense
the cell’s charge, the SA sets the bitline to the precharge
level (Vdd /2). Second, the cell (at Vdd or 0V) shares its
charge with the bitline, which produces a small change in
the voltage of the bitline ((Vdd/2)± δ ). Third, the SA is
activated and it amplifies the delta of the bitline voltage
towards the original value of the cell.
DRAM Operation The memory controller issues three ba-
sic commands as part of a DRAM read or write operation:
1) the Activation (ACT) command senses and amplifies
the data from the target row into the row buffer; 2)
the read/write (RD/WR) command transfers data from/to
the row buffer to/from the DRAM bus; 3) the Precharge
(PRE) command clears the row buffer and prepares the
subarray for subsequent read/write operations (precharges
the bitlines).
Figure 2 details the steps for reading a DRAM cell.
1 Initially, the bitline is precharged to Vdd /2 with the
wordline set to 0V. 2 To access data from DRAM, the
memory controller first issues an ACT command, which
raises the voltage of the target wordline and connects the
2
cells of that row to the bitline. This causes the deviation
of the bitline voltage in one direction (charge sharing). 3
As a result, the sense amplifier senses and amplifies this
deviation (sensing phase). After reaching this phase, the
memory controller can issue RD or WR commands. The
time needed to finish the ACT command is specified by the
timing parameter tRCD. 4 The sense amplifier continues
to amplify the deviation until the voltage of the cell is
fully restored. 5 After that, the controller issues a PRE
command to lower the wordline voltage back to 0V and
drive the sense amplifier and bitline to Vdd /2 . The time
needed to complete a PRE command is specified by the
timing parameter tRP. Once precharged, the subarray is
ready for the next access.
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Figure 2: DRAM Activation (ACT), Read (RD) and
Precharge (PRE) commands.
3. Overview of DATAPLANT
Dataplant is a new class of low-cost in-DRAM primi-
tive that enables high-performance implementations of se-
curity mechanisms via generating unpredictable yet repro-
ducible values in DRAM. We propose two variants of Dat-
aplant, which enable a 1) new class of high-performance
and robust PUF, and 2) a new cold boot attack prevention
mechanism that does not incur performance and energy
overheads at runtime.
3.1. Dataplant Primitives
US-Dataplant (Unpredictable Values in the DRAM SAs)
generates unpredictable values in a DRAM SA by ex-
ploiting process variation inherent in DRAM SAs. We
implement US-Dataplant by simply altering the timing of
two DRAM signals during a standard activation operation.
The generated values can be read by the processor from
the SAs without overwriting the data in DRAM, or they
can be optionally stored in DRAM.
UC-Dataplant (Unpredictable Values in the DRAM
Cells) generates an unpredictable value in a DRAM cell by
exploiting process variation inherent in DRAM cells. We
implement UC-Dataplant by altering the timing of only
one DRAM signal during a standard precharge operation.
UC-Dataplant requires two steps. First, UC-Dataplant sets
a DRAM cell to the precharge voltage. Second, when the
cell is next activated, the cell assumes an unpredictable
value based on process variation. Unlike US-Dataplant,
UC-Dataplant requires overwriting the original content of
the cell for generating a value.
The Dataplant primitives are very similar to DRAM
activation and precharge commands. This makes our ap-
proach easy to integrate into commodity DRAM chips, and
facilitates its adoption by industry and standards bodies.
Section 4 describes the circuit-level implementation details
of the two primitives, and Section 7.1 evaluates their
latency, energy, and area.We also propose a new Dataplant
implementation that generates deterministic values by in-
troducing an additional transistor in the SA. Appendix A
describes and evaluates this implementation.
3.2. Implementing Security Mechanism
Using Dataplant Primitives
To demonstrate the potential of Dataplant, we use UC-
Dataplant and US-Dataplant to implement new approaches
of two common security mechanisms.
Dataplant PUFs. We propose two new Dataplant DRAM
PUFs (based on US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant) that
have four unique characteristics. First, the US-Dataplant-
based PUF does not have a destructive read out. Second,
the latency of Dataplant PUFs is very low (i.e., the same
as a precharge or activation latency), which makes Dat-
aplant suitable for runtime access. Third, Dataplant PUF
responses are not as noisy as other state-of-the-art DRAM
PUFs, which results in more stable PUF responses. Fourth,
Dataplant PUF responses are very stable across a wide
range of temperatures.
Preventing Cold Boot Attacks. Although DRAM mem-
ory is volatile, the stored data does not immediately dis-
appear at power-off. Data can be naturally retained in
DRAM cells up to minutes after a power-off [33], which
enables cold boot attacks [20]–[23], [32], [33] (i.e., the
data can be read as soon as the device is powered back
up). We propose a mechanism completely implemented
in DRAM chips (i.e., it does not require external DRAM
commands) that destroys all the data in DRAM by au-
tomatically issuing Dataplant primitives when the chip is
powered up. Unlike prior mechanisms to prevent cold boot
attacks [34]–[39], our Dataplant-based mechanism protects
against even a computationally unbounded adversary, as
it makes brute-force attacks impossible. Our mechanism
requires no changes aside from the existence of the Dat-
aplant primitives, incurs no latency or energy overhead
at runtime as it operates only at power-up, and is secure
because it is an automatic mechanism self-contained in
DRAM.
Section 5 and Section 6 discuss the implementation
of these mechanisms in detail. Additionally, Appendix B
describes and evaluates secure deallocation, an additional
security mechanism that can be implemented with Data-
plant.
4. Dataplant Implementation
This section shows the implementation details of
two Dataplant variants that have different features. To
illustrate how they operate, we use a detailed SPICE
model to simulate the SA, cell, bitline and wordline. We
implement the SA using 55nm DDR3 model parame-
ters [44] and PTM low-power transistor models [45],
[46]. We use cell/transistor parameters from the Rambus
power model [44] (cell capacitance = 22fF; transistor
width/height = 55nm/85nm).
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Figure 3: SPICE simulation of the internal DRAM signals involved in precharge command and (a) an activation command,
(b) a US-Dataplant primitive (including the optional overwriting of the cell), and (c) a UC-Dataplant primitive. In all
cases, Vdd=1V and the original content of the DRAM cell is “one” (VCell). The dashed lines and the arrows (→, ↑)
illustrate the changes in the timing signals required to implement US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant.
For reference, Figure 3a shows the simulation of a
standard DRAM activation command. As explained in
Section 2.1, a standard activation command 1) raises the
voltage of the wordline (VWL) to connect the cell to the
bitline, which causes a deviation in the bitline voltage, and
2) triggers the SA (VSA) for sensing this bitline voltage
variation and restoring the charge of the cell towards its
original value.
4.1. US-Dataplant Primitive
US-Dataplant generates unpredictable values by ex-
ploiting mainly SA process variation. The value generated
by US-Dataplant has little influence from the process vari-
ation of other components (e.g., bitline). The key idea is to
trigger the SA without raising the voltage of the wordline,
i.e., the cell doesn’t deviate the voltage of the bitline. By
doing so, the SA amplifies the bitline voltage towards an
unpredictable value that 1) doesn’t depend on the charge
of the cell, and 2) depends on the SA process variation.
Once the SA drives the bitline towards the final generated
unpredictable value, US-Dataplant can optionally write
this value into the cell by raising the wordline voltage.
Figure 3b shows how US-Dataplant generates a value
(including the optional overwriting of the cell). The dashed
lines and the arrow (→) highlight that, when writing to
the cell (optional), US-Dataplant raises the voltage of
the wordline always after triggering the SA logic. US-
Dataplant triggers the SA (VSA) 1 when the bitline (VBL0)
is precharged (i.e., Vdd /2 = 0.5V) 2 , and the SA drives the
bitline towards a value (0V in the figure) that depends on
process variation 3 . At this point, the memory controller
can issue a read command to get the generated value
from the SA. After generating the value, US-Dataplant
can optionally write the generated value in the DRAM
cell by raising the voltage of the wordline (VWL) 4 , which
overwrites the content of the cell with the generated value
(VCell) 5 . Notice that the voltage of the wordline must be
raised after triggering the SA (→).
To illustrate the effects of process variation in the
values generated by US-Dataplant, we perform SPICE
simulations for five instances of a common SA design
(details in Section 7.1) with small changes in their physical
characteristics that simulate process variation. Figure 4
shows the generated values for five SAs examples with
different process variation values depending on the voltage
of the bitline. US-Dataplant always amplifies a bitline with
Vdd/2 voltage (precharge voltage) to generate a value.
We observe that the generated value for Vdd/2 bitline
voltage depends on the SA’s process variation: SAs with
variation -δ , 0 +δ an +2δ generate a zero value, while
-2δ generates a one value. These process variation at
fabrication time cannot be controlled or cloned, and their
layout is unpredictable and unique for each device.
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Vdd
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Figure 4: Values restored by five SAs with different pro-
cess variation, depending on the the bitline voltage. US-
Dataplant generates values always at Vdd/2 bitline voltage.
4.2. UC-Dataplant Primitive
UC-Dataplant generates unpredictable values by ex-
ploiting mainly DRAM cell process variation. The value
generated by UC-Dataplant has little influence from the
process variation of other components (e.g., bitline, word-
line, SA). They key idea is to set the cell to the same volt-
age as the bitline precharge voltage (Vdd/2) by triggering
the precharge logic and raising the wordline voltage at the
same time. In the next activation, raising the voltage of
the wordline doesn’t disturb the bitline voltage (because
the cell has the same Vdd/2 voltage as the bitline), and
the SA amplifies towards an unpredictable value. The
anomalies and perturbations introduced by the cell process
variation [47] are the main factors that determine the
unpredictability of the generated value.
Figure 3c shows how UC-Dataplant sets the cell to
Vdd/2 voltage. The dashed lines and the arrow (↑) are
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for highlighting that UC-Dataplant activates the precharge
logic instead of the SA logic. The wordline voltage (VWL)
is raised 1 at the same time as the precharge logic
is triggered 2 (VPrecharge), which drives the cell (VCell)
towards Vdd /2 3 . Our SPICE simulations show that UC-
Dataplant consumes the same power independently of the
initial value of the cell (as the final value is always Vdd /2).
Section 7.2.2 evaluates the feasibility of UC-Dataplant by
emulating the values it generates on real DRAM chips.
4.3. Hybrid-Dataplant Primitive
We propose a low-cost Hybrid-Dataplant primitive that
1) implements US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant into the
same DRAM module, and 2) provides a mechanism to
select the Dataplant implementation at runtime.
Different applications might require different charac-
teristics that a single implementation can not provide. Our
two Dataplant implementations have three main trade-
offs. First, UC-Dataplant relies on destroying the previous
content of the cell for generating data, while US-Dataplant
can generate data in the SA with or without destroying
the DRAM content. Second, UC-Dataplant executes faster
than US-Dataplant, but it requires an additional activa-
tion command to generate the unpredictable value. US-
Dataplant, however, can generate and access the data with
only one command. Third, UC-Dataplant value generation
relies on the DRAM cell process variation, which are
orders of magnitude smaller than the SA. Consequently,
UC-Dataplant is potentially more sensitive to technology
scaling effects [48].
Hybrid-Dataplant primitive enables to choose the prim-
itive that better fits the requirements of the applica-
tion. Hybrid-Dataplant implements US-Dataplant and UC-
Dataplant together with low hardware overhead by lever-
aging one free bit in the in-DRAM mode registers (MR)
to encode the implementation to use, and the load mode
register (LMR) command to change the implementation
to use at runtime. In commodity DDR4 modules, the
MR3 register has 13 unused bits that enable to select the
Dataplant primitive independently in 13 different DRAM
partitions (e.g., in different DRAM banks).
4.4. Security and Reliability
In this section we discuss the security and reliability
of US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant primitives.
Security. US-Dataplant does not leak any information
about the previous content of the cell because it generates
values that are independent of the cell content (Figure 3).
UC-Dataplant, as described in Section 4.2, first discharges
the DRAM cells in a row, and it then activates the sense
amplifiers. If an attacker manages to interfere between
these two steps, they could try to bias the cells towards
some particular value before the amplification (e.g., row
hammer [49]). However, these two steps are executed
back-to-back in a few nanoseconds, which is not enough
time to induce any row hammering [49] or similar attacks
that require milliseconds to succeed [50], [51].
Reliability. We observe that the main reliability issue
related to DRAM is associated with the reduction of the
amount of charge that can be stored in a DRAM cell,
which can make the sensing phase unreliable [48], [52].
SAs are in general more resilient to reliability issues [48],
[53] because they are three orders of magnitude larger than
DRAM cells [44]. Based on these observations, we make
two conclusions. First, we do not expect major reliability
issues on US-Dataplant as it does not use the cells for
generating values. Second, although UC-Dataplant uses
the DRAM cells for generating values, UC-Dataplant does
not have a sensing phase because the cell is set to Vdd/2
voltage. Therefore, we expect the reliability of a US/UC-
Dataplant primitive to be higher than the reliability of a
regular activation/precharge.
4.5. Hardware Cost
The hardware cost of implementing Dataplant in
DRAM is very low. Incorporating our new Dataplant
primitives require very few modifications in the control
logic that generates the control signals. The changes are
limited to add a few extra logic gates to delay the wordline
signal in a regular activation (US-Dataplant), and to trigger
the access transistor and the precharge logic at the same
time (UC-Dataplant). To the best of our knowledge, there
is no public information about how vendors implement
the control logic, or what is the specific circuit design
of that logic (see Appendix C). The hardware cost of our
primitives is very low in any case, because our mechanism
can reuse most of the logic for generating the activation
and precharge timing signals.
5. Dataplant PUFs
A PUF is a hardware primitive that maps a set of
challenges to a set of static random responses that are
derived from the physical characteristics of an integrated
circuit (e.g., process variation). A PUF can be used as a
building block for implementing low-cost authentication
protocols [54]–[57] and key generation applications [7],
[9], [10].
One or more parameters (e.g., the address of a memory
segment, temperature, etc.) define a challenge, and the
data read from DRAM is the response to that challenge.
Together, they define a Challenge-Response pair (CR pair).
In this work, we use the address of the segment as the only
parameter that defines a challenge.
Limitations of State-of-the-art DRAM PUFs. Prior
DRAM-based PUF proposals exploit variations in DRAM
start-up values [24], DRAM write access latencies [25],
DRAM cell retention failures [26], [28], [58] and reduced
DRAM timing parameters [29], [40]. There are five main
limitations with most of these approaches. First, most
of these PUFs rely on the charge that is contained in
DRAM cells, thus all the content of the memory region
employed for the PUF is irreversibly overwritten. Using
these PUFs requires either 1) exclusive memory regions
for PUFs or 2) copying and restoring the original contents
for each PUF challenge request. Second, most DRAM
PUFs [29] have high evaluation time, which can poten-
tially cause system interference when the PUF is accessed
at runtime. Third, many of these PUFs require heavy
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filtering mechanisms to deal with the inherent noisy nature
of the DRAM responses, which increases the evaluation
latency and the reliability of the responses. Fourth, the
responses to the same challenge suffer great variations
with temperature changes, which is an issue in systems
with a non-controlled environment (e.g., IoT devices in
the wild). Fifth, some DRAM PUFs are data dependent,
which might cause mismatching responses that depend on
the content of the memory. Our Hybrid-Dataplant PUFs
overcome all of these five limitations.
US-Dataplant PUF. US-Dataplant PUF has six key dis-
tinctive properties. First, US-Dataplant PUF does not re-
quire destroying the current memory content, because it
does not need to assert the wordline to generate a re-
sponse.Second, US-Dataplant PUF responses do not de-
pend on the actual content of the cell, because the charge
of the cell shared and amplified. Third, US-Dataplant PUF
can be evaluated with a latency as low as the latency of a
regular activation. Fourth, a US-Dataplant PUF response is
less noisy than most state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs, which
enables lighter filtering mechanisms and reduced latency.
Fifth, US-Dataplant PUF is particularly robust because
SAs are much less sensitive to environmental conditions,
interference from other elements, and scaling issues [49].
Sixth, the downside of US-Dataplant PUF is that it has
a small CR pair space that is limited by the number row
buffers in DRAM (∼8MB in a 4GB DRAM).
UC-Dataplant PUF. UC-Dataplant PUF has six distinc-
tive properties. First, UC-Dataplant has a CR pair space as
large as the DRAM capacity, because it uses DRAM cells
to generate responses. Second, the evaluation latency of
UC-Dataplant PUF is as low as the latency of a precharge
operation. Third, UC-Dataplant PUF is more reliable under
temperature variations than the state-of-the-art solutions,
as we demonstrate in our evaluation (Section 7.1). Fourth,
UC-Dataplant PUF requires an additional activation to
read out the PUF response. Fifth, UC-Dataplant PUF is
more sensitive to scaling issues than US-Dataplant PUF,
because the generated responses depend mainly on the
DRAM cells. Sixth, UC-Dataplant PUF necesarily de-
stroyes the current memory content.
Hybrid-Dataplant PUF. To get the best properties of
our two Dataplant PUFs, we can easily implement US-
Dataplant PUF and UC-Dataplant PUF in the same DRAM
module with minimal hardware overhead. The application
can choose, according to its requirements, the PUF to use
(US-Dataplant or UC-Dataplant) by configuring the MRs
accordingly (see Section 4.4).
System-Level Support for Accessing Dataplant PUFs.
There are at least two ways of enabling software access
to Dataplant PUFs, either by adding a new instruction
to the instruction set architecture for reading the PUF
response [59], [60], or by using a dedicated address range
to map the PUF operations to regular load instructions.
On the DRAM side, there are two implementation
options. First, adding a new mode that provides the US-
Dataplant and UC-Dataplant functionalities instead of the
regular activation and precharge commands. The mode
can be selected by changing dedicated MRs (see Sec-
tion 4.4). Second, introducing a new command in the DDR
specification. The new command has the same general
requirements as a regular activation (US-Dataplant) or as
a regular precharge (UC-Dataplant). We can integrate the
new command in the JEDEC standard specification [43]
without extra cost, as there is unused, reserved space as
part of the standard for new commands.
Security Analysis Dataplant PUFs are more secure, less
noisy, and more stable with temperature changes than
state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs. The Dataplant PUF re-
sponses responses pass all the NIST randomness tests.
Note that all DRAM PUFs have a CR pair space that is
limited by the DRAM capacity. Security applications that
use DRAM PUFs as a building block have to engineer the
security mechanism carefully to avoid, for example, that
an attacker with physical access to the device characterizes
the entire device and compromise its security.
6. Preventing Cold Boot Attacks
This section shows how Dataplant enables an effi-
cient and simple mechanism to prevent cold boot attacks.
Cold boot attacks [20]–[23] are possible because the data
stored in DRAM is not immediately lost when the chip is
powered-off. This is due to the capacitive nature of DRAM
cells that can hold their data up to some seconds [33].
This reminiscent effect can be even more significant if the
DRAM module is cooled down. Taking advantage of this
property, an attacker can either take the victim’s DRAM
module off and place it in a system under their control
with minimal information loss, or boot a small special
purpose program from a cold reset to recover the secret
information.
6.1. State-of-the-Art Defenses
There are three classes of mechanisms for preventing
cold boot attacks. First, mechanisms that rely on en-
crypting memory either explicitly [20], [34]–[39], [61],
or implicitly through some CPU extensions (e.g. Intel
SGX [1]). These mechanisms are effective and secure,
but are too complex and expensive (in terms of energy
and performance overhead) to be implemented in many
low-cost devices. Second, modern systems scramble the
data in the memory controllers, which helps to obscure
the DRAM contents. This mechanism is simple and is also
required for other purposes (e.g., improve signal integrity
in the DRAM bus), but it has been shown to be inse-
cure against cold boot attacks [20]. Third, the mechanism
proposed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [62]
to reset the DRAM content upon power-off (or power-on
if the last power-off was not clean). This mechanism is
implemented on the host platform firmware and depend
on the OS, which makes it vulnerable to attacks [63].
6.2. Threat Model
We tackle an attacker that gains physical access to
a live uncompromised machine/device for an unlimited
amount of time and whose goal is to obtain some infor-
mation stored in the device’s DRAM. Note that, for any
interesting information to be present in DRAM the attacker
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should get the memory while it is still powered-on. We
then assume that, as part of the attack, the DRAM chip is
powered-off for an arbitrarily short amount of time. This
power loss occurs when transplanting the DRAM module
to an attacker-controlled machine and during attacks that
reboot the victim machine to load a malicious OS. Note
that some computers allow warm reboots, in which the
power is not cut off. Our cold boot attack prevention
mechanism is not compatible with those systems.
We are not aware of alternative methods to power-on
the DRAM, other than using the corresponding DRAM
PINs. Therefore, until a technique that can attach a stable
external power supply (while the chip is already powered
on) to the DRAM chip is engineered, transplanting a chip
from one machine to another would inevitably involve a
power loss. However, even if this is possible, we speculate
that it would require expensive specialized equipment,
significantly increasing the cost of an otherwise cheap
attack.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, transplant-
ing the DRAM and rebooting to a different OS are the
only ways to perform a cold boot attack today, and both
involve a power loss. In particular, we are not aware of
any other techniques that allow measuring the charge in
the DRAM capacitors, including x-ray techniques.
6.3. Destroying Data at Power-On
We make the observation that it is possible to protect
from cold boot attacks by deleting all memory contents
during the DRAM power-on. Based on this observation,
we propose two new cold boot attack prevention mecha-
nisms. First, Self-destruction, a low-cost in-DRAM mech-
anism based on Dataplant that destroys all the DRAM
content without the intervention of the memory controller.
Second, Command-based Destruction, a low-cost mech-
anism orchestrated by the memory controller that allows
a more flexible implementation at the cost of providing
weaker security guarantees.
6.3.1. Self-destruction. The key idea of Self-destruction
is to refresh the whole DRAM memory in self-refresh
(SR) mode at power-on, but using Dataplant primitives
instead of activation commands. This way, the DRAM
chip executes a destructive DRAM refresh that can be
performed autonomously without the intervention of the
memory controller.
The basic principle of a DRAM refresh is to perform
an activation and a precharge command to the row to be
refreshed. As we show in Section 4, US-Dataplant is very
similar to an activation command, and UC-Dataplant is
very similar to a precharge command, which allows to eas-
ily incorporate them in the refresh operations, leveraging
the circuitry that launches regular SR cycles. With Self-
destruction, the data is destroyed in a complete SR win-
dow, i.e., 64ms (32ms for LPDDR). During the destructive
SR, the DRAM does not allow any memory commands to
ensure the atomicity of the process.
Self-destruction in a Burst refresh. Burst refresh is
a refresh mode that is available on Low-power DDRn
(LPDDRn) devices. The main idea of the burst refresh is to
complete all the required refreshes in a single burst, with
the goal of meeting the deadlines of real-time applications.
Our Self-destruction mechanism is also compatible with
this refresh mode that allows destroying data much quicker
(e.g., 9ms for a 4GB DDR4 memory module).
Security Analysis. Our mechanism is automatically trig-
gered in DRAM when power is detected, without requiring
external actions. Therefore, the security of Self-destruction
depends on the reliability of the power-on detection circuit
of the DRAM module. There are two ways in which an
attacker can potentially bypass this circuit. We describe
both ways and explain why, in practice, they do not pose
a security threat.
First, an attacker could operate DRAM at low voltage
on the compromised system using, for instance, Dynamic
Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS), with the goal of
not triggering the power-on detection circuit. The power-
on circuit triggers when it detects a voltage ramp up from
0V , but it does not need to reach Vdd (it triggers as long as
a voltage ramp up starting from 0V is detected). Therefore,
operating the DRAM at very low voltage would not help
the attacker.1
Second, an attacker could fry the DRAM power-on
detection mechanism. In practice, however, the FSM that
initializes the chip is in the same internal controller that
regulates other functions (i.e., timing signals for activate,
precharge, and other commands). Consequently, frying
that component would most likely make the whole DRAM
unusable.
Hardware Cost Analysis. The hardware cost of imple-
menting our Self-destruction mechanism in DRAM is
very low. The implementation of Dataplant has very low
overhead (Section 4.4), and the logic to trigger a self-
refresh window at DRAM power-on is negligible. Trigger-
ing Dataplant instead of regular activations in the refresh
process requires minimal modifications on the in-DRAM
control logic (see Section 4.5).
6.3.2. Command-Based Destruction.. The key idea of
Command-Based Destruction is to force DRAM to obey
a particular sequence of commands issued from the mem-
ory controller that leads to the destruction of the whole
memory content during the initialization procedure. The
mechanism can be implemented with regular write com-
mands, with Rowclone [59], with Lisa-clone [60] or with
our new Dataplant primitives.
The Command-Based Destruction relaxes the security
guarantees since it is conducted by the memory controller.
An attacker could easily bypass this procedure by us-
ing a customized memory controller or a programmable
one [64]. To solve this issue, we add a mechanism in
DRAM that ensures the execution of the appropriate se-
quence of commands in the initialization procedure. The
mechanism uses a latch that indicates when the DRAM
is performing the initialization and, during this phase,
the DRAM chip filters out any other command. Imple-
menting this mechanism requires adding a new FSM in
1. The attacker might try to operate the device at a voltage close to
0V such that the power-on circuit cannot detect the ramp up, however,
at such low voltage the DRAM would not be operational.
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DRAM, which adds hardware and energy overhead to the
existing circuitry. Also, a DRAM module that implements
Command-Based Destruction can operate only with com-
patible memory controllers (i.e., no backward compatible).
Security Analysis. Compared to Self-destruction,
Command-based Destruction has weaker security
guarantees, because it is not self-contained in-DRAM,
and it does not destroy the memory contents automatically
in-DRAM at power-on. Nevertheless, it is very challenging
to bypass the DRAM FSM that disables read commands
until the memory is destroyed by the memory controller.
Compared to TCG (Section 6.1), Command-based
Destruction provides better security guarantees, as our
mechanism does not provide any software interface to
control the DRAM initialization mechanism.
Hardware Cost Analysis.
Self-destruction does not require modifications in the
memory controller, and it requires minimal changes in the
DRAM logic that controls the signals to issue Dataplant
commands instead of regular activation and precharge
commands.
Compared to Self-destruction, Command-based De-
struction is more complex to integrate into current systems.
It requires the modification of the memory controller, and
it requires the addition of dedicated DRAM logic to ensure
the integrity and atomicity of the destruction protocol.
Command-based destruction issues Row-
clone/Lisa/Dataplant requests from the memory controller.
Similar to the PUF mechanism (Section 5), there are
two options to issue these requests. First, adding a
new DRAM command to the DDR JEDEC standard
specification [43] by leveraging the unused and reserved
bits available in the standard protocol. Second, adding
new logic in the in-DRAM command decoder that
decodes existing commands (e.g., activation, precharge)
into Rowclone/Lisa/Dataplant commands depending on
some new configuration bits in the SR registers (similar
to Section 4.4).
7. Evaluations
We evaluate the Dataplant primitives (Section 7.1), the
Dataplant DRAM PUFs (Section 7.2) and our cold boot
attack prevention mechanism (Section 7.3).
7.1. Dataplant: Latency, Energy, and Area
Methodology. In this section we study the latency and
energy overhead of Dataplant primitives for generating and
overwriting values in a single DRAM row. We compare
our Dataplant primitives to the state-of-the-art mechanisms
for copying data within DRAM, namely Lisa-clone [60]
and Rowclone [59]. Rowclone and Lisa-clone propose
in-DRAM methods to initialize data to zero by copying
a reserved row filled with zeros to the destination row.
Both solutions modify the internal architecture of DRAM
and slightly reduce the DRAM’s capacity since they need
helper data to work. We compare Dataplant primitive
against Rowclone and Lisa-clone because there are no
other works that generate data within DRAM in the same
way Dataplant does.
We estimate the latency of US-Dataplant, UC-
Dataplant, Rowclone and Lisa assuming DDR3 timing
constraints. We calculate their energy consumption by
using the activation and precharge energy consumption
described in the power model of the DRAMPower sim-
ulator [65].
Latency and Energy Results. Table 1 shows the absolute
value and the reduction of latency and energy of the
evaluated techniques, when generating a value in a 8 KB
DRAM row. We also show the in-DRAM latency and
energy consumption of standard activation and precharge
commands. The baseline generates data by overwriting the
memory contents with regular write commands from the
memory controller. We make three major observations.
First, the latency and energy consumption of our two
Dataplant primitives are significantly reduced compared
to the baseline, Lisa-clone and Rowclone. Second, UC-
Dataplant is significantly faster than US-Dataplant, mainly
because it avoids the activation of the SA. However, the
UC-Dataplant numbers on the table do not include the
additional activation command needed read the values out
of DRAM (see Section 4.2). Third, the latency and energy
consumption of US-Dataplant/UC-Dataplant is the same as
a standard activation/precharge command.
TABLE 1: Latency and energy of different in-DRAM
primitives for overwriting 8KB of data, and standard ac-
tivation and precharge commands.
Absolute Reduction
Primitive Lat. (ns) Ener. (nJ) Lat. Ener.
Baseline 546 2000 1.0x 1.0x
Lisa-clone 148.5 90 3.67x 22.2x
Rowclone 90 50 6.06x 41.5x
Activation 35 17.3 15.6x 116x
Precharge 13 17.2 42x 116x
US-Dplant 35 17.3 = 7.3 + 10 15.6x 116x
UC-Dplant 13 17.2 42x 116x
Table 1 also shows the Dataplant energy breakdown
(value generation + overwriting). The energy consumption
is very close on the two Dataplant implementations be-
cause of two main reasons. First, the two implementations
need to route the address within DRAM, which is one of
the main sources of energy consumption (around 40%).
Second, the energy consumption of the sense amplifier
(used in US-Dataplant) and the precharge logic (used in
UC-Dataplant) are similar (around 40%). Notice that over-
writing in US-Dataplant is optional, hence they require
only 7.3nJ and 8nJ respectively to generate an 8KB value,
while in UC-Dataplant both processes are indivisible, re-
quiring always 17.2nJ for generation+overwriting.
Our SPICE simulations show that the power demanded
by US-Dataplant can vary up to 5% depending on the
initial value contained on the cell.
Area Overhead. US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant has
negligible area overhead caused by the additional logic that
controls the signal timings (more detail in Section 4.5).
Lisa-clone has an area overhead of 1% caused by the
additional isolation transistors, additional control logic,
and one additional zero-filled row per bank. The overhead
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of Rowclone (0.2%) is caused by the additional zero-filled
row per subarray.
7.2. Evaluating the Quality of Dataplant PUFs
To evaluate US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant PUFs, we
reproduce the responses of US-Dataplant with SPICE sim-
ulations, and we reproduce the responses of UC-Dataplant
in real DRAM chips with an FPGA-based infrastructure.
7.2.1. Simulating US-Dataplant PUF with SPICE.
We evaluate US-Dataplant PUF with SPICE simulations.
Unfortunately, it is unfeasible to conduct experiments on
real DRAM chips, as US-Dataplant requires changes to
the internal DRAM timings, which are hard-wired in
commodity DRAM chips.
Methodology. To show the effects of process variation
on the values generated by US-Dataplant, we evaluate a
detailed SA SPICE model (see Section 4) using Monte
Carlo simulations. We model variations in all the affected
components of the SAs (transistor length/width/threshold
voltage). Our SA model always generates ‘1’ bits in
absence of process variation. When we introduce process
variation into the simulation, we observe that some SAs
generate ‘0’ bits as well (called unpredictable values). We
run 100,000 simulations for each variation.
Results. Table 2 shows the percentage of SAs that gen-
erate unpredictable values for different levels of process
variation and different temperatures.
TABLE 2: Effect of Process Variation (PV) and temper-
ature on the unpredictability of the values generated by
US-Dataplant.
PV effects Temperature effects (4% PV)
2% 3% 4% 5% 30◦C 60◦C 70◦C 85◦C
Unpred. 0% 0% 0.02% 0.19% 0.02% 0.19% 0.21% 0.15%
We make two main observations. First, small process
variations (<4%) are not enough to generate unpredictable
values. Second, large process variations increase the un-
predictability of the generated values. As the technology
scales, process variation becomes more significant, which
increases the unpredictability of the values generated by
US-Dataplant PUF (i.e., it increases the PUF quality).
Third, temperature changes do not cause significant vari-
ation in the unpredictability of the generated values.
7.2.2. Evaluating UC-Dataplant PUF Responses in
Real DRAM Chips. We evaluate the quality of the UC-
Dataplant PUF responses with a new methodology that
allows us to recreate the functional behavior of the UC-
Dataplant PUF without implementing it in real DRAM
chips. Notice that it is not possible to implement UC-
Dataplant PUF in commodity DRAM devices, because
Dataplant requires changes to the internal DRAM tim-
ings. We perform an exhaustive evaluation using 136 real
DRAM chips from 15 modules.
Methodology. An UC-Dataplant primitive 1) sets a cell to
Vdd/2 with the precharge logic, and 2) activates the SA to
generate an unpredictable value from that cell. As we don’t
have the resources to make a real DRAM implementation,
we emulate this behavior in real DRAM chips in two steps.
First, based on the observation that a DRAM cell leak
towards Vdd/2, we disable the DRAM refresh for 48 hours
with the goal setting the cell to Vdd/2. Second, we activate
this cell to obtain the PUF response. This methodology
allows us to reproduce the responses that would produce
a real UC-Dataplant PUF implementation. Recall that dis-
charging the cells would take a few nanoseconds (not 48h)
in a real implementation (Section 7.1). We perform our
experiments with a customized memory controller built
with SoftMC [64] and a Xilinx ML605 FPGA on 136
different DDR3 DRAM chips from three major vendors.
Table 3 shows the main characteristics of the 136
DRAM chips we use in our evaluation, including vendor,
number of chips (#Chips), capacity of a chip (capac-
ity/chip), frequency, and voltage.
TABLE 3: Characteristics of the 136 DDR3 DRAM chips
used in our evaluation.
Vendor #Chips capacity/chip Frequency Voltage
A 32 512MB 1600 1.35V (DDR3L)
A 32 512MB 1600 1.5V (DDR3)
B 32 256MB 1333 1.5V (DDR3)
B 8 512MB 1600 1.35V (DDR3L)
C 32 512MB 1600 1.35V (DDR3L)
Emulating the UC-Dataplant PUF functional behavior
with our methodology is challenging, because DRAM cells
can retain their content for a long time [66], i.e., not
refreshing the DRAM does not guarantee that a cell will
be end up with the precharge voltage (Vdd/2), even after
a long period.
To deal with this issue, we tailor a custom test to
determine if a cell is set to the precharge voltage. As
discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, when a cell is set to the
precharge voltage, the value that UC-Dataplant generates
should be always the same regardless of the initial value
of the cell. Based on this observation, our test analyzes
the final value of a DRAM cell after 48 hours without
refresh, in two different scenarios: 1) all initial values are
zero and 2) all initial values are one. The test has two
possible outcomes. First, the test passes if the final value
is the same regardless of the initial value. Thus, we can
conclude that the cell is set to the precharge voltage. In
this case, the final value should be the one that a real UC-
Dataplant implementation would generate. Second, the test
fails if the final value is different. In that case, we cannot
conclude that the cell is set to the precharge voltage (i.e.,
we cannot infer the value generated by UC-Dataplant), so
we do not consider that cell in our results.
Results. Our experiments cover between 34% to 99%
of all cells, which are the cells that end up with the
precharge voltage using our methodology. The percentage
of generated values that are unpredictable because of
process variation is between 0.01% and 0.22%, which
is in line with the results we obtained with our SPICE
simualtions2. To measure the uniqueness and similarity
of a PUF, we apply Jaccard indices [67] as suggested
by prior works [29], [58], [68], [69]. We determine the
2. We evaluate the randomness of the values generated by UC-
Dataplant in Section 7.2.4
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Jaccard indices by taking two sets of unpredictable values
(u1,u2), i.e, two sets of PUF responses, from two memory
segments, and calculating the ratio of their shared values
over the full set of unique unpredictable values |u1∩u2||u1∪u2| .
A ratio close to 1 represents high similarity, and a ratio
close to 0 represents uniqueness.
We use the term Intra-Jaccard for representing the
similarity of two sets from the same memory segment, and
Inter-Jaccard for representing the uniqueness of two sets
from different memory segments. An ideal PUF should
have an Intra-Jaccard index close to 1 (a unique challenge
has a unique response), and an Inter-Jaccard index close
to 0 (different challenges have different and random re-
sponses).
We compute the distribution of Intra- and Inter-Jaccard
indices obtained by running experiments on 136 different
DRAM chips with segments of 8KB (this size is used by
prior work [29]). We calculate the Intra-Jaccard indices for
10,000 random pairs of memory segments (each pair com-
posed of two responses from the same memory segment),
and the Inter-Jaccard indices for 10,000 random pairs of
memory segments (each pair composed of two responses
from different memory segments) from all DRAM chips.
We compare UC-Dataplant PUF with the DRAM
latency PUF [29]. The DRAM Latency PUF accesses
DRAM with reduced timing parameters, which causes
some read failures that fulfill the requirements of a good
PUF. We implement the DRAM Latency PUF by reducing
tRCD to 2.5ns, as it is the timing value that reports the
best results in our setup. For improving the repeatability
of the responses, the DRAM latency PUF implements
a filtering mechanism that removes the cells with low
failure probability from the PUF response. To this end,
the mechanism reads the memory segment 100 times, and
it composes a response that contains only the failures that
repeat more than 90 times [29].
The values generated by UC-Dataplant are much
less noisy than the values obtained by reducing the ac-
cess latency, so UC-Dataplant PUF needs a much more
lightweight filtering mechanism: we actually observe that
one read is enough to get a robust UC-Dataplant PUF
response in most cases, but we apply a conservative filter
of 10 UC-Dataplant requests to obtain more robust PUF
responses in worst case conditions. While a DRAM la-
tency PUF with a lightweight filtering mechanism (e.g.,
1-10 reads) could be as fast as Dataplant PUFs, the PUF
quality would decrease significantly (Section 7.2.3), com-
promising the functionality and security of the PUF-based
authentication protocol.
Figure 5 shows the Intra- and Inter-Jaccard indices
of UC-Dataplant PUF and DRAM Latency PUF [29] for
64 DDR3 chips operating at 1.5V and 72 DDR3L chips
operating at 1.35V.
We make four main observations. First, the UC-
Dataplant PUF shows very good Intra-Jaccard indices
(almost all indices are one), and pretty good Inter-Jaccard
indices (the indices are distributed next to zero). Sec-
ond, the DRAM latency PUF without filter has Intra-
Jaccard indices distributed all over the spectrum (far from
ideal), which does not satisfy the similarity property of
a good quality PUF. This issue is solved by using the
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Figure 5: Jaccard indices obtained with the DRAM latency
PUF (with and without filter), and with the UC-Dataplant
PUF, on both DDR3 and DDR3L chips.
filtering mechanism, which biases the values of the Intra-
Jaccard indices towards to one, at the cost of increasing
the evaluation time (Section 7.2.3). Third, the DRAM
Latency PUF has very good Inter-Jaccard indices, very
close to zero. Fourth, the results from DDR3L chips are
better than those from DDR3 chips, for both the DRAM
Latency PUF and the UC-Dataplant PUF. We conclude
that the UC-Dataplant PUF is very effective on getting
very similar of responses to the same challenge, while
maintaining uniqueness between responses from different
memory segments.
Based on our results, a naive challenge-response au-
thentication mechanism implemented with UC-Dataplant
that correctly authenticates only when the response is
exactly the expected (i.e., no filtering mechanism), has an
average false rejection rate of 0.64% and an average false
acceptance rate of 0%.
Temperature and Aging Effects. To demonstrate how
temperature affects the similarity of different responses to
the same challenge, we evaluate the UC-Dataplant PUF
and the DRAM latency PUF under different temperatures,
ranging from 30◦C to 85◦C. We use the experimental setup
from the previous experiment, a DRAM heater, and a fine-
grain temperature controller that can control the temper-
ature with a precision of ± 0.1◦C. For this experiment,
we only need to wait for 4 hours (instead of 48 hours),
since cells discharge faster at high temperatures. Figure 6
shows the Intra-Jaccard indices between the same seg-
ments under different temperatures. Our main observation
is that the UC-Dataplant PUF is very robust to temperature
changes, as the responses to the same challenge are very
similar even for extreme temperature changes (55◦C). The
responses of the DRAM latency PUF are much more
sensitive to temperature changes, confirming the results of
the original work [29]. We conclude that the UC-Dataplant
PUF performs much better than the DRAM Latency PUF
under changing temperature conditions.
To demonstrate how aging affects the similarity of dif-
ferent responses to the same challenge, we use accelerated
aging techniques to artificially age our DRAM chips [70]–
[74]. We artificially age the DRAM chips by operating
them at 125◦C degrees running stress tests during 8 hours.
Figure 7 shows the Intra-Jaccard indices between the same
segments before and after the aging. We observe that UC-
Dataplant is very robust to aging (most of the Jaccard
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Figure 7: Intra-jaccard vs Accelerated aging during 8 hours
at 125◦C.
7.2.3. Evaluation Time. The evaluation time of our Data-
plant PUFs is in the same order of magnitude or faster than
the fastest state-of-the-art DRAM PUF. The evaluation
latency of the UC-Dataplant PUF is the same latency as
executing a precharge command, an activation command,
and reading 8KB of data. The evaluation latency of US-
Dataplant PUF is the same latency as performing an
activation command, and reading 8KB of data.
We observe that, in the worst DRAM chip we tested,
Dataplant PUF responses to the same challenge are exactly
the same 99.72% of the times. To ensure reliable PUF be-
havior, we also implement a filtering mechanism similar to
the filter implemented in DRAM Latency PUF, but using
only 5 Dataplant requests. Using this filtering mechanism,
all responses to the same challenge are exactly the same
in our experiments. We also implement an alternative to
the filtering mechanism (similar to PreLatPUF [40]) that
profiles the DRAM memory and identifies the DRAM
cells that provides robust PUF responses, which enables to
eliminate the filtering mechanism. We compare our PUF
to the same DRAM Latency PUF [29] we use in the
previous section, and to a PreLatPUF [40] that generates
PUF responses by reducing the precharge latency. Table 4
summarizes the total evaluation time of the evaluated
DRAM PUFs.
TABLE 4: PUF evaluation time of the DRAM Latency
PUF, PreLatPUF, and the Dataplant PUF, using 8KB mem-
ory segments.
Latency
PUF
PreLatPUF Dataplant
PUFs
Dataplant
PUFs
(no-filter)
88.2ms 1.59ms 4.41 ms 0.88 ms
We make two observations. First, the Dataplant PUFs
with/without filter have 20x/100x lower evaluation latency
than a DRAM Latency PUF. Second, the Dataplant PUFs
without filter are 1.8x faster than the PreLatPUF, but
Dataplant PUFs with filter is 5x slower than PreLatPUF.
Although the filter mechanism slows down the PUF eval-
uation latency, it also avoids other issues related to the
no-filter mechanism, such as initial profiling, metadata
accesses and management, etc. We also perform experi-
ments using a filtering mechanism with 5 responses in the
DRAM Latency PUF, but this causes a large degradation
of the PUF quality (Section 7.2.2) and compromises the
functionality and security of the PUF-based authentication
protocol.
We conclude that our mechanism is faster that the best
state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs.
7.2.4. Randomness Analysis. A secure key or seed
should be random and have high-entropy. Although we
already demonstrated the uniqueness of the responses
between different memory segments (Section 7.2.2), this
does not guarantee properties such as high-entropy.
Methodology. We analyze the randomness of the values
generated by UC-Dataplant with real DRAM chips (Ta-
ble 3), with the experimental setup of Section 7.2.2. We
generate a sequence of numbers composed by the relative
position of the unpredictable values in a cache line. We use
the NIST statistical test suite [41] to analyze the numbers
generated by UC-Dataplant.
Results. We run the NIST test suite with the responses
to different challenges from all the tested DRAM chips.
We collect the PUF responses and we form up to 250KB
sequence numbers. Table 5 shows the average NIST p-
values and NIST final results for the numbers generated
by UC-Dataplant. We use a customized version of the Von
Neumann extractor [75] for whitening the random stream.
TABLE 5: Dataplant average results with the NIST ran-
domness test suite.
NIST Test. P-value Result
monobit 0.681 PASS
frequency within block 1.000 PASS
runs 0.298 PASS
longest run ones in a block 0.287 PASS
binary matrix rank 0.536 PASS
dft 0.165 PASS
non overlapping template matching 0.808 PASS
overlapping template matching 0.210 PASS
maurers universal 0.987 PASS
linear complexity 0.0185 PASS
serial 0.988 PASS
approximate entropy 0.194 PASS
cumulative sums 0.940 PASS
random excursion 0.951 PASS
random excursion variant 0.693 PASS
Our main observation is that the numbers generated by
UC-Dataplant pass all 15 NIST tests, which demonstrates
that our PUF is able to generate good quality random
numbers.
7.3. Preventing Cold Boot Attacks
We evaluate our new Command-Based Destruction and
the Self-Destruction mechanisms described in Section 6.
We customize the memory controller to implement the
Command-Based Destruction with Rowclone, Lisa-clone,
US-Dataplant, and UC-Dataplant. We implement Self-
Destruction with US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant. We also
implemented the TCG specification [62] for preventing
cold boot attacks (see Section 6.1).
11
Methodology. We customize Ramulator [76] to support
the two proposed Dataplant implementations, Rowclone
and Lisa-clone. Table 6 shows the summary of the DRAM
and memory controller configurations used in our evalua-
tion.
Our baseline is the TCG software cold boot attack
prevention mechanism. We evaluate TCG by simulating a
firmware approach that overwrites the memory with zeros
by issuing regular write requests. To force writing back
the data to memory from cache, we use an instruction
that invalidates the data on cache (i.e., the CLFLUSH
instruction in x86). TCG does not require any hardware
changes other than the BIOS customization.
We implement our Self-Destruction and Command-
Based Destruction. Self-Destruction takes place entirely
within DRAM, and it is implemented only with Dataplant.
We implemented the two variants of Self-Destruction
described in Section 6.3.1, namely Self-Destruction us-
ing self-refresh and Self-Destruction using burst refresh.
Command-Based Destruction issues commands from the
memory controller that destroy data in DRAM with Row-
clone, Lisa-clone, US-Dataplant, and UC-Dataplant prim-
itives.
To calculate latency of Dataplant we use the SA design
described in [77], and to calculate the energy we use a cus-
tomized version of DRAMPower [65]. For US-Dataplant,
we use the same timing parameters as a regular activation,
and for UC-Dataplant, we use the same timing as a regular
precharge (see Section 4 for details).
TABLE 6: System configuration for evaluating our cold
boot attack prevention mechanism.
Proc. in-order core, 32KB L1 D&I, 512KB L2
Mem. Ctr. 64/64-entry read/write queue, FR-FCFS [78], [79]
DRAM 1-2 channels, DDR3-1600 x8 11/11/11
We have already done a security analysis and hardware
cost analysis of our mechanisms in Section 4.4. In this
evaluation we show the latency improvements and the
energy savings.
Latency Results. Figure 8 shows the destruction time (in
seconds, logarithmic scale) of the TCG software imple-
mentation, the Command-Based Destruction (Cmd-D) us-
ing all primitives, the Self-Destruction with Burst Refresh
(Self-D-Burst) using Dataplant, and the Self-Destruction
with Self-Refresh (Self-D-SR) using Dataplant. We as-
sume the same timing parameters for US-Dataplant and
UC-Dataplant as regular activation and precharge com-
mands (e.g., tFAW and tRDD) to meet internal DRAM
power restrictions. Although we show that UC-Dataplant
can perform faster than US-Dataplant for individual prim-
itives (Table 1), the power restrictions are very similar,
which limits the throughput of UC-Dataplant. In practice,
the latency results of US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant are
identical for the cold boot attack prevention mechanism
(Cmd-D Dataplant and Self-D-SR Dataplant in the figure).
We test different DRAM sizes, from 64MB, used in
memories specifically designed for IoT [5], to 64GB, used
in high-end servers [80]. Our simulator takes into account
all timing parameters defined by the DDR standard [43].
The timing parameters for each size are taken from public
datasheets released by vendors [81]. For the memories that
we don’t have enough information about timing parame-
ters (e.g., 64MB, 64GB), we extrapolate the parameters
from existing memory modules.
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Figure 8: Time (log scale) to destroy all DRAM data using
a software implementation (TCG), our Command-based
Destruction (Cmd-D), our Self-Destruction using Burst
refresh (Self-D-Burst Dataplant) and our Self-Destruction
using Self-Refresh (Self-D-SR Dataplant).
We make four major observations. First, Self-
Destruction based on burst refresh performs 19.5x bet-
ter than Rowclone and 32.6x better than Lisa. Second,
the Command-based destruction (Cmd-D) shows toler-
able values for small and medium memory sizes. The
Command-based Dataplant implementation performs 1.5x
better than Rowclone, and 2.5x better than Lisa. Third,
Self-Destruction based on Self-Refresh has the same la-
tency as a regular refresh window. This approach shows
the best trade-off between performance and complexity
(see Section 6.3.1). Fourth, the software-based destruction
mechanism (TCG) has a high latency, especially for large
DRAM sizes, which delays the boot time of the system
significantly. Also, TCG does not provide strong security
guaranties, as we discuss in Section 6.1.
Energy Results. Table 7 shows the energy savings of our
mechanism implemented with different hardware primi-
tives, compared to TCG.
TABLE 7: Energy savings of different mechanisms that
destroy all DRAM data, compared to TCG.
Cmd-D Lisa Cmd-D Rowclone Self-D-Burst & Self-D-SR Dataplant
25x 45x 114x
The energy consumption of Self-Destruction is ap-
proximately the same as the Command-Based approach
(excluding the energy of the bus). We observe that our Dat-
aplant implementations show large energy savings com-
pared to TCG (114x), and very significant energy savings
compared to Lisa-clone (4.5x) and Rowclone (2.54x).
Comparison with other State-of-the-Art Mechanisms.
There exist other mechanisms that protect against cold
boot attacks that are fundamentally different to our
approach. This is the case with memory encryption,
which provides strong security guarantees at the cost
of additional energy consumption. Table 8 shows the
performance, power, and area overhead of our Self-
Destruction mechanism compared to ChaCha-8 [20] and
AES-128 [20], two low-cost ciphers that can be used to
prevent cold boot attacks efficiently [20].
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TABLE 8: Overhead of our Self-Destruction mechanism
based on Dataplant compared to two other mechanisms
to prevent cold boot attacks on an Intel Atom N280
processor.
Self-Destruction ChaCha-8 [20] AES-128 [20]
Runtime Performance 0% 0% 0%1
Runtime Power2 0% 17% 12%
Area ∼0% 0.9% 1.25%
1 when less than 16 back-to-back row hits.
2 at peak bandwidth utilization.
We make two main observations. First, our Self-
Destruction mechanism has zero performance and power
overhead at runtime, and very low hardware cost, which
make it difficult to beat as a low-cost method for pre-
venting cold boot attacks. Second, although ChaCha-8
and AES-8 can be implemented for hiding the encryption
latency in the common case [20], the power and area
overheads of ChaCha-8 and AES-128 are significant in
low-cost processors such as the Intel Atom N280. We
conclude that our zero-overhead proposal is a very efficient
way to protect against cold boot attacks in systems where
encryption 3 is not an option.
8. Related Work
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to propose
low-cost in-DRAM primitives that enable security mecha-
nisms in all systems that use DRAM. We demonstrate two
applications of our primitives: (1) PUF-based authentica-
tion and (2) cold boot attack prevention.
In-Memory Operations. We already compare Dataplant
to Lisa [60] and Rowclone [59]. As we discussed, Data-
plant is a very low overhead set of in-memory primitives
to generate data for security mechanisms. Prior works
on in-memory operations target other basic functionalities
in commodity DRAM chips, such as AND/OR bitwise
operations [82]–[85]. A number of works perform pro-
cessing near memory using 3D-stacked memories, which
often contain a logic layer, but such logic requires a much
greater logic cost [86]–[89].
PUFs. We have already compared our Dataplant PUFs to
the DRAM Latency PUF [29] and to the PreLatPUF [40].
Many PUFs have been investigated in different compo-
nents, such as SRAM [90]–[95], ASIC logic [96], [97], and
DRAM [24], [28], [29], [40], [58]. There is one DRAM
PUF that can be accessed during runtime (other than the
DRAM Latency PUF). The Runtime DRAM PUF [58] dis-
ables refresh in certain memory regions that are initialized
with specific values. The PUF response is a function of
the errors produced in the cells due to a lack of refresh
after some time t. Our Dataplant-based PUFs have lower
evaluation times than the state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs. In
addition, our Dataplant PUFs provide 1) non-destructive
read-out, 2) low evaluation latency, 3) robust responses, 4)
resiliency to temperature changes, and 5) data-independent
responses, characteristics that any other DRAM PUFs can
provide all together.
3. While AES-128 and ChaCha-8 provide additional security features,
we evaluate their ability to prevent cold boot attacks, as studied in recent
literature [20].
Cold Boot Attacks Several works propose encryption
mechanisms to protect data against different attacks, in-
cluding cold boot attacks [35]–[37], [39], which usually
introduce performance and energy overheads. Various pro-
posals attempt to reduce these overheads [34], [36], [38],
[98]. Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [1] can
create protected areas of memory that ensure confidential-
ity and integrity of the data by using strong encryption
(AES) and message authentication codes (MAC). Other
papers propose to use modern stream ciphers as a fast
way to encrypt memory [20], [99].
A work on data lifetime management [100] proposes
to disable access to the data in DRAM, as another solution
for cold boot attacks. The authors provide a new flag in
the DRAM decoder, controlled by a DRAM command,
that controls the access to a DRAM row for untrusted
programs. Unlike our Dataplant-based cold boot attack
prevention mechanism, this prior work does not prevent
an attacker with physical access from having free access
to the rows.
Seol et al. [101] propose a mechanism to initialize
DRAM with a reset operation based on connect/disconnect
power lines. This reset operation has larger latency than
Dataplant, as it requires a precharge and an activation
command. In comparison, Dataplant requires only one
command to destroy the content of the cell. Memory
scramblers are the main protection against cold boot at-
tacks in modern unencrypted memory systems. However,
these scrambling mechanisms are not sufficient to pro-
tect against cold boot attacks, as demonstrated by prior
works [20], [33].
Our mechanism for protecting cold boot attacks im-
proves the state-of-the-art by proposing a very simple
mechanism with no performance or energy overhead at
runtime.
9. Conclusion
We propose Dataplant, a set of low-cost, highly ef-
ficient, and reliable in-DRAM primitives that can enable
important security mechanisms at low-cost on any device
that uses DRAM. The main idea of Dataplant is to slightly
modify the internal DRAM timing signals to expose the
inherent process variation found in all DRAM chips for
generating unpredictable but reproducible values within
DRAM. We build two low-cost security mechanisms using
Dataplant for demonstrating the potential of our primitive.
First, a Dataplant-based physically unclonable functions
(PUFs) that improve state-of-the-art DRAM PUFs.Second,
a new cold boot attack prevention mechanism based on
Dataplant that has zero performance and energy overhead
at runtime.
We show in our evaluation that these two mechanisms
are significantly faster and more energy-efficient than their
state-of-the-art counterparts, with the same or better secu-
rity guarantees. We conclude that Dataplant can effectively
enable low-cost and low-power security mechanisms for
all types of devices that use DRAM, from low-cost devices
to high-end servers. This paper is a first step towards a
more secure DRAM memory. We hope and expect that
the availability of Dataplant in commodity DRAM chips
will enable new security features and applications.
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Appendix A.
D-Dataplant primitive
In this Appendix we discuss D-Dataplant
(Deterministic Dataplant), an alternative Dataplant
implementation with different characteristics than US-
Dataplant and UC-Dataplant. D-Dataplant generates
deterministic values within the SAs by adding a transistor
to each SA in the row buffer. The generated values can
be stored in DRAM, or can be read by the processor
from the SAs without overwriting data in DRAM.
D-Dataplant deterministically drives the bitline voltage
level to zero (0V) or one (Vdd), and optionally writes
the generated value into the cell. The key idea is to add
an additional path connecting a fixed voltage level to
the bitline. To this end, we add an additional transistor
controlled by a Dplant signal. Figure 9 (left) shows how
this transistor is connected into the SA to generate a
”zero” or a ”one” value. Figure 9 (right) illustrates how the
Dataplant transistor drives the cell towards a deterministic
value (zero in this case).
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Figure 9: Dataplant transistor placement (left), and be-
haviour (right).
Figure 10 shows how the value is generated (including
the optional overwriting of the cell). First, the Dplant
(VDplant ) 1 and the SA 2 (VSA) signals are triggered for
driving the bitline to the deterministic voltage level (zero
in the example) 3 . Then, if the wordline is triggered 4
(VWL), the generated value is moved to the DRAM cell 5
(VCell), overwriting the previous content of the cell.
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Figure 10: SPICE simulation of the internal DRAM signals
involved in D-Dataplant. Vdd=1V and the original content
of the DRAM cell is “one” (VCell).
A.1. Evaluation
Table 9 shows the absolute value and the reduction
of latency and energy of D-Dataplant when generating a
value of 8 KB, compared to the baseline, Rowclone, Lisa,
US-Dataplant and UC-Dataplant. We also show the in-
DRAM latency and energy consumption of standard acti-
vation and precharge commands. The table also shows the
Dataplant energy breakdown (value generation + overwrit-
ing) of D-Dataplant (D-Dplant). The energy consumption
of D-Dataplant is very similar to US-Dataplant and UC-
Dataplant because the additional transistor of D-Dataplant
has a very low effect on the energy consumption.
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TABLE 9: Latency and energy of different primitives for
generating 8KB of data.
Absolute Reduction
Primitive Lat. (ns) Ener. (nJ) Lat. Ener.
Baseline 546 2000 1.0x 1.0x
Lisa-clone 148.5 90 3.67x 22.2x
Rowclone 90 50 6.06x 41.5x
Activation 35 17.3 15.6x 116x
Precharge 13 17.2 42x 116x
US-Dplant 35 17.3 = 7.3 + 10 15.6x 116x
UC-Dplant 13 17.2 42x 116x
D-Dplant 35 18 = 8 + 10 15.6x 111x
Area Overhead. The main area overhead of D-Dataplant
is caused by an additional transistor per SA. Our SPICE
simulations show that this transistor can be very small, but
we consider a full-size transistor to avoid possible layout
and fabrication issues. Considering an SA composed of
20 transistors [77], the worst case overall area overhead is
between 0.4% and 2% depending on the DRAM design.
4.
Appendix B.
Secure Deallocation
In this Appendix we describe and evaluate secure
deallocation, a security application that can be efficiently
implemented with any Dataplant primitive. However, this
application is especially suitable for D-Dataplant (Ap-
pendix A) because most Operating Systems require that
newly allocated memory is filled with zero values.
Today’s applications, especially web servers, web
browsers, and word processors, do not immediately re-
move data from memory when it is no longer needed.
Instead, the data is physically erased only when the mem-
ory is required for other uses. As a consequence, sensitive
data could remain in memory for an indefinite amount of
time, which augments the risk of exposure.
Secure deallocation [42], [102]–[106] is a technique
that set the data to zero at the moment of deallocation,
or as soon as the data is not needed anymore. This
technique reduces the time that critical data is exposed
to attacks. Vanish [105] proposes a similar idea in which
the old copies of data are self-destroyed after a specific
amount of time. Dataplant enables the implementation of
the previous techniques with very low latency, energy, and
area overhead.
B.1. Evaluation
Methodology. We simulate US-Dataplant (Section 4.1),
UC-Dataplant (Section 4.2), D-Dataplant (Appendix A),
Lisa-clone [60], Rowclone [59] and a software secure
deallocation mechanism [42].
We customize Ramulator [76] to support all the mech-
anisms on in-order cores. To generate the traces that drive
our simulator, we use PIN [107] for user-level traces,
and the Bochs [108] full-system emulator to generate the
4. This depends on the number of cells per bitline in the subarray,
which determines the total number of SAs in the module.
memory traces that include Linux kernel page allocations
and deallocations.
To calculate the area, energy, and latency of our Dat-
aplant primitives, we use the SA design described in
Section 4. To estimate the energy consumption of the
DRAM module, we use a customized version of DRAM-
Power [65]. Table 10 shows the system configuration used
in our evaluation.
TABLE 10: System configuration.
Processor 1-4 cores, in-order,
Cache L1:64KB, L2:512KB per core, 64B lines
Mem. Ctr. 64/64-entry read/write queue, FR-FCFS [78], [79]
DRAM 1 channel, DDR3-1600 x8 11/11/11
Table 11 describes the 6 memory-allocation-intensive
benchmarks we use. For the multicore evaluation (4
cores), we choose 50 mixes of workloads, in which
each mix is composed by two memory-allocation-
intensive benchmarks, and two benchmarks that are non-
memory-allocation-intensive. The non-memory-allocation-
intensive benchmarks are TPC-C [109], TCP-H [109],
STREAM [110], SPEC2006 [111], DynoGraph (pagerank,
bfs, stream) [112], and HPCC RandomAccess [113]. Ta-
ble 12 shows 5 representative benchmark mixes.
TABLE 11: Memory-allocation-intensive benchmarks
used for evaluating secure deallocation.
Bench. Description
mysql MySQL [114] loading the sample employeedb.
mcached Memcached [115], a memory object caching system
compiler Compilation phase from the GNU C compiler
bootup Linux kernel booting up phase
shell Script running ’find’ in a directory tree with ’ls’
malloc stress-ng [116] stressing the malloc primitive
TABLE 12: Five representative mixes (out of 50) used in
the multicore evaluation for secure deallocation.
MIX1: malloc, bootup, tpcc64, libquantum MIX4: malloc, shell, xalancbmk, bzip2
MIX2: shell, bootup, lbm, xalancbmk MIX5: malloc, malloc, astar, condmat
MIX3: bootup, shell, pagerank, pagerank
Results. Figure 11 shows the single-core speedup (higher
is better) and energy savings (higher is better) of Data-
plant and other state-of-the-art mechanisms (Rowclone and
Lisa-clone) normalized to a software secure deallocation
implementation.
We make three observations. First, all hardware im-
plementations improve the performance up to 21% and
the energy savings up to 34%, compared to a software
implementation. Second, Dataplant performs better than
Lisa-clone and Rowclone in all cases, both in perfor-
mance and energy consumption. Third, the performance
improvements and energy savings of Dataplant compared
to Rowclone and Lisa-clone are not very large for some
benchmarks. Note, however, that our approaches are much
easier to integrate on commodity DRAM chips than Lisa-
clone or Rowclone (Section 4).
Figure 12 shows the speedup and energy savings of
Dataplant and other state-of-the-art mechanisms in a 4-
core processor, normalized to a software secure dealloca-
tion implementation.
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Figure 11: Single core speedup (larger is better) and
energy savings (larger is better) of the secure deallocation
hardware approaches compared to a software approach.
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Figure 12: 4 core speedup (larger is better) and energy sav-
ings (larger is better) of the secure deallocation hardware
approaches compared to a software approach.
We make the same observations as for a single core
processor: 1) all hardware approaches improve the soft-
ware implementation, 2) Dataplant performs better than
Lisa-clone and Rowclone, and 3) the performance im-
provements and energy savings of Dataplant compared to
Rowclone and Lisa-clone are not very large.
We conclude that 1) implementing secure deallocation
with hardware approaches can have significant perfor-
mance and energy benefits, and 2) Dataplant is the best
option to accelerate secure deallocation because it has the
best performance and energy results, and it is the approach
that is simpler to integrate in commodity DRAM chips.
Appendix C.
DRAM Logic
To the best of our knowledge, there is no public infor-
mation about how vendors implement the control logic, or
what is the specific circuit design of that logic. However,
this logic should be very similar to other DRAM logic.
There are at least two types of logic styles that can be
used to issue signals in DRAM [77]. First, the delay-chain
logic style is composed of a mixture of combinational
gates, monostable multivibrators, and latches. This logic is
implemented with a series of delays such that a sequence
of functions can be executed without a clock. Second, the
domino logic uses logic gates that require a clock signal,
and it enables to implement logic functions from a cascade
of events. The hardware cost of our primitives is very low
in both cases, because our mechanism can reuse most of
the logic for generating the activation and precharge timing
signals.
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